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BEYOND TINKERING:
ECONOMICS AFTER BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

INTRODUCTION
Economic theory is a sort of distilled common sense: it draws out the implications of the
view that people act to best get what they want, given what they believe about their
circumstances. That basic insight is used to build mathematical models that are intended to
explain and predict human behavior. Those models are useful in many ways—most centrally,
they allow us to structure incentives in order to achieve important ends.1 Structuring incentives,
on any kind of large scale, is a job for governments, and the tool they use is the law. Thus, it
should come as no surprise that lawmakers have looked to economic theory for guidance. And,
indeed, the law and economics movement has become, by almost any measure, the most
dominant school of legal thought in the last half a century.
But there is sufficient reason to conclude that economic theory, as it stands, is flawed.
While economic models have had their successes, a large and growing body of empirical
evidence reveals that people often fail to live up to the rational-actor ideal of standard
economics. Real people, it turns out, use mental shortcuts. They display systematic biases when
they make decisions. And they occasionally take actions that conflict with their interests, in both
the long and short term. As a result, the behavior of real people is often at odds with that
predicted by standard economic theory.

1

There is some debate about what those ends should be. Normally, we try to maximize people’s ability to
get what they want, on the assumption that they know their own needs. In certain cases, however, we seek to
discourage the pursuit of certain ends, e.g., heroin-induced stupors.
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Social scientists respond to this evidence in a variety of ways. Economists usually stick
with standard consumer theory and attempt to explain the anomalous empirical results by
reference to some overlooked input (some new belief, for example) or by applying the models in
new ways. Sufficiently subtle application of economic analysis, they claim, can account for the
troublesome cases. Behavioral economists accept standard consumer theory as both a normative
benchmark and a rough approximation of the relevant causal mechanisms of behavior, but
propose new models meant to capture the way behavior deviates from the standard account.
These models retain the basic structure of economic theory while replacing its simple
mathematical representations of belief and desire with alternatives that better fit the evidence.
In the last decade, legal scholars have taken up the cause and incorporated behavioral
economics into their study of the law. Some have carried out empirical research involving legal
situations that confirm and, in some cases, further refine behavioral models. Others take the
behavioral models as given, and use them to make suggestions about specific areas of the law
(such as contract law) or to argue broader normative points (such as the proper scope of
governmental paternalism). As a result, much of the work of fleshing out the findings of
behavioral economics is now being done in law schools, not economics departments.
But behavioral economics and its legal incarnation are not without problems of their own.
Chief among these is the fact that, unlike standard economics, behavioral economics has not
coalesced into a unified theory of behavior. At its core it is a collection of psychological
phenomena—norms, biases, and heuristics—that are connected only in the sense that each runs
counter to some fundamental tenet of traditional economics. Some have charged, we think
unfairly, that behavioral economics is nothing more than this collection.

Like many

exaggerations, however, this one contains a grain of truth. Behavioral economists generally do

3

just build the data into their models. Where, for example, behavior seems risk averse for gains
and risk loving for losses, behavioral accounts posit motivational structures (e.g., wants,
interests, values) that are risk averse for gains and risk loving for losses. And where behavior
seems to reflect an overemphasis on low probability events, behavioral accounts posit belief
structures that overweight low probabilities. The result of this straightforward approach is a set
of data-driven modifications for standard economic models. To the extent that the empirical
evidence allows, behavioral economics adopts standard economics as it is.
Behavioral economists usually appeal to only one or two modifications to account for a
given behavioral regularity.

This raises a number of problems.

Where only a single

modification of an orthodox model suffices to capture the data, are the other psychological
features absent, and, if so, why? Appeal to different sets of modifications may give individually
plausible but jointly inconsistent (and irreconcilable) explanations for a particular bit of
behavior. The lack of a unified theory also makes it harder to figure out how behavioral and
standard economics fit together. There are many instances where standard accounts seem to get
things right. Are people rational, self-interested maximizers only some of the time, and, if so,
when?

These issues show how difficult it is to translate the teachings of behavioral economics

into positive law, if for no other reason than it is difficult to convince policymakers to rely upon
relatively isolated, apparently intermittent, features of human behavior.
This issue has not gone unnoticed by those in behavioral law and economics. In the
introduction to his leading book in the field, Cass Sunstein notes:
Behavioral law and economics is in its very early stages, and an enormous amount
remains to be done. Some of the outstanding questions are foundational and
involve the nature of economics itself: Can behavioral economics generate a
unitary theory of behavior, or is it an unruly collection of effects? Is it too ad hoc
and unruly to generate predictions in the legal context? As compared with
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approaches based on ordinary rationality assumptions, does behavioral economics
neglect the value of parsimony?2
Noticing the issue and doing something about it, however, are two entirely different matters.
And despite a wealth of empirical work, there has been surprisingly little done in the way of
answering these fundamental questions. Behavioral economists resolutely focus on the trees
with very little attention to the forest, and, as a result, they have failed to develop a single,
consistent account of economic behavior.

Until this failure is rectified, it is unlikely that

behavioral economics will capture the full attention of legal academics, and, more importantly,
legal policymakers.
A primary reason for the failure of behavioral economics to confront important questions
is its continued unreflective reliance on the basic economic paradigm.

Indeed, the usual

behavioral methods for accommodating the empirical evidence take the basic economic account
as canonical. Accept, reject, or tinker with the functional forms, most economists, standard and
behavioral, confine themselves to thinking about the particular elements of common sense that
originally inspired economic models.
There is, however, another approach. Economic theory (and its successors) might be too
distilled—after all, there is much more to our common-sense theory of behavior than the claim
that people act to get what they want. Recognizing this possibility allows us to step back and
look to common sense for additional resources to enhance economic models in an idea-driven,
“top down” fashion, as opposed to a data-driven, “bottom up” way.
This paper will discuss one such approach, based on Frederic Schick’s work on
understandings.

Drawn from the well of common-sense psychology, the concept of

understandings presents an additional element to the basic desire-belief apparatus that underlies
2

Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 1, 9 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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economic theory. The idea, in a nutshell, is that people normally consider their circumstances
from a particular (more or less narrow) perspective. As a result, they act on proper subsets of
their beliefs and desires that reflect their take on their situations.3 It is important to see that
appeal to understandings is not an alternative to paying close attention to psychological evidence.
Rather, it is a way of enhancing our ability to accommodate that evidence in a coherent way.
This approach has the advantage of being readily integrated into standard economic theory and is
capable of shedding crucial light on many of the situations that give standard accounts trouble
(and give rise to behavioral alternatives). As such, it is a step in the direction of a more unified
theory of human behavior.

I. LAW AND ECONOMICS
Standard economic theory has its roots in our normal, everyday theory about how people
act (what philosophers often call “folk psychology”). The basic elements of the theory are
desires and beliefs, and the central relationship between the two is that people act to fulfill their
desires given what they believe about their situation.4 While this is primarily a normative
account—we think that such actions make sense in an important way, so people should so act5—

3

As we will see, the subset of a person’s mental states that she uses to think about a situation constitutes
her understanding of that situation.
4
This is, for example, Richard Posner’s basic line on rationality. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (6th ed. 2003); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1998).
5
To act on this norm is to act rationally in a particular sense. “Rational” is a term of approval,
commendation, or endorsement. To say that something is rational is to say that it makes sense in some way. See,
e.g., ALAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 6-7 (1990). Instrumental rationality, the sort of rationality
involved in economics, is primarily concerned with the fitness of actions to wants. A person’s desires are treated as
the baseline for evaluating her behavior and actions are commended when they advance the objects of those wants.
An instrumentally rational action is endorsed from the perspective of certain goals. This is a conditional
commendation—if the actor has appropriate desires then the action makes sense. Saying that something is
instrumentally rational is, however, a strong commendation. An instrumentally rational action is a good way to
achieve an agent’s ends, whatever they are. Instrumental rationality applies derivatively to actors and choices. An
instrumentally rational agent is one who takes instrumentally rational actions. Someone might be instrumentally
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we usually assume that people approximate the norm. The idea that people act to get what they
want, given what they believe, plays an important role in how we navigate the world. We use it,
for example, to help predict the behavior of others, even of complete strangers. We think of
another driver that she doesn’t want to die or be seriously hurt; that she knows there is a truck
there and that pulling out in front of such a truck runs the risk of death or serious injury; so we
conclude that she won’t pull out. Such predictions are usually pretty close to the mark. We also
use the principle to form judgments about the characters of others. We think of our neighbor, for
instance, that he saw that his wife was uncomfortable with his story; that he went ahead and told
it anyway; we conclude, therefore, that he must not care much about her feelings (jerk!).
The idea that people act to achieve their ends, given what they think, is a core principle of
folk psychology. Economic theories are really just ways of formalizing (or better, regimenting)
this core principle. The rational choice account of behavior that underwrites modern economics
is, as David Lewis masterfully puts it, “a systematic exposition of the consequences of certain
well-chosen platitudes about belief, desire, preference and choice. It is the very core of our
common-sense theory of persons, dissected out and elegantly systematized.”6 The desires,
attractions, and aversions of common sense are all aggregated into the preference rankings of
rational choice economics (and these preference rankings are numerically represented by utility

rational in general or on a particular occasion. An instrumentally rational choice is one made on the grounds that it
is a best (good) way to achieve an end. It is usually held that people should take instrumentally rational actions, i.e.,
that it is good (at least ceteris paribus) to be an instrumentally rational person, because instrumental rationality is a
necessary component of more full-blooded evaluation. One can’t intentionally achieve desirable ends unless one’s
actions achieve ones ends, whatever they are. Instrumental rationality is often invoked in descriptive as well as
normative claims. It picks actions for each set of ends in each circumstance—the actions that best satisfy those
ends—and so defines a correspondence between situations (as represented by beliefs) and actions. Once the
correspondence is defined, we can ask if people actually act in accordance with it. This is where the social science
discussion gets serious.
6
DAVID LEWIS, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOL 1, 114 (1983).
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functions).7 Beliefs about available actions, surrounding circumstances, and other people are all
modeled with subjective probability functions. Choice of action is treated as the result of
subjective expected utility maximization (that is, the action chosen is one with the highest
probability-weighted average utility). In standard economic accounts, all of a person’s wants
(interests, values, etc.) are reflected in her utility function.

Likewise, all of her beliefs

(judgments, hunches, etc.) are reflected in her subjective probabilities.

Actions, then, are

understood as the result of a person’s whole mind.
The common sense at the core of economics helps to explain its influence. While most
people can’t be bothered with the mathematical models themselves, they retain their intuitive
appeal because they are a “scientized” version of normal psychology. Despite the fact that
everyday explanations do not employ the language of modern economics, or come with the same
mathematical baggage, we see evidence of economic principles in our common-sense attempts to
explain and predict human behavior. When, for example, we explain Luke’s failure to make his
customary trip to the ice cream shop by reference to his refusal to pay a dollar more for his cone,
we’ve spelled out the basic story of downward sloping consumer demand.8 Economic principles
should be even more readily apparent in our attempts to explain, systematically guide, and
predict the effects of various strategies to change human behavior. This should be true, for
example, when parents devise a set of rules for their children, with attendant rewards and
punishments. For example, we expect that rewards will “buy off” children and punishments will
“raise the costs” of bad behavior. It should be equally true when we construct rules to guide

7

The way in which different attractions fit together to guide actions in various circumstances is not wellunderstood. See Stephen Ellis, Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action
(forthcoming in SYNTHESE).
8
In emphasizing the common sense roots of economic theory, we don’t mean to deny that it can be used to
explain puzzles or make novel predictions. It isn’t obvious, for example, that raps stars (or lawyers) will make more
money than middle school teachers (or philosophers). Still, appeal to economic principles can help explain this fact.
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adult behavior, especially when it comes to rules that we spend some time thinking about. That
is, it should be true of the law.
Thus, it should not have been surprising when it was “discovered” that the common law
appeared to be driven by an underlying economic logic. Nonetheless, the law and economics
movement expended much of its early energy examining the many instances in which the
common law appears to maximize allocative efficiency.9 Sometimes, the common law did so
quite explicitly, as with the Learned Hand formula for negligence liability. 10

More often,

however, judges appeared to come to decisions that implicitly comported with the dictates of
economics.

For example, the defense of impossibility in contract law, which excuses

nonperformance under a contract when intervening events render performance physically or
legally impossible, tends to promote efficiency by assigning liability to the party who could
avoid or spread the risk of the intervening events at the least cost.11 Similar claims of efficiency
were made with respect to a rather wide range of doctrines from salvage awards in admiralty12 to
the degrees of homicide in criminal law13 to the limited scope of the right to privacy. 14 “It is,”

9

See Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G. Medema, Schools of Thought in Law and Economics: A Kuhnian
Competition, in Law and Economics: New and Critical Perspectives 65, 71-75 (Robin Paul Mallow & Christopher
K. Braun eds., 1995) (explaining how the Chicago School of law and economics began with a positive analysis of
various lawmaking institutions); see also POSNER, supra note 4, at 25, 249-56 (“The theory is that the common law
is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of society”); Richard A. Posner, Some Uses
and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287-91 (1979) (discussing the fact that common law rules
tend to promote efficiency).
10
Judge Hand explained tort liability on the basis of a mathematical cost benefit analysis: “[I]f the
probability [of the accident] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions], B; liability depends
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.” United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947).
11
See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law:
An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
12
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers:
An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 83, 100-08 (1978).
13
See POSNER, supra note 4, at 233-35.
14
See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978).
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notes Richard Posner, “as if the judges wanted to adopt the rules, procedures, and case outcomes
that would maximize society’s wealth.”15
Law and economics scholars also spent a bit of time attempting to come up with an
explanation for this “efficiency hypothesis.”16 Perhaps, it was argued, inefficient legal rules
were subject to more numerous and intense legal challenges because parties had greater
incentives to replace them with efficient rules (and the inefficient rules were thus driven out of
the common law).17 Or maybe parties sought alternative forums for resolving disputes, such as
arbitration, in situations where legal rules consistently led to inefficient allocations (and the
common law thus competes with other systems of dispute resolution).18 Or perhaps judges are
just naturally drawn to rules that promote efficiency.19

To this day, there is no generally

accepted theory as to why the common law promotes economic efficiency. But given that the
nature of the law is to provide generalized rules to govern human behavior, it is no surprise that
law and economics was such a fruitful match; the only real question is why it took so long for the
two to find each other.
Despite its intuitive appeal and breadth of support in the law and elsewhere, economic
theory is controversial. A number of social scientists—psychologists, sociologists, and even
other economists—argue that standard economic accounts fail to adequately explain or predict
human action. The criticisms fall into two broad areas. The first holds that economic theory is
too stripped-down. It doesn’t even pass the “sniff test” because it ignores certain important
behavioral inputs—things like mistakes, compulsions, social norms and roles—and instead

15

RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 356 (1990).
For a brief discussion of the various theories, see Mercuro & Medema, supra note 9, at 72-73.
17
See POSNER, supra note 15, at 360; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 492-96
16

(1988).
18
19

See Mercuro & Medema, supra note 9, at 72.
See id. at 25.
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appeals to such alien notions as utility and efficiency. Economist David Kreps captures the
people-aren t-like-that feel of this objection when he notes:
These models of consumer and firm behavior typically strike people as fairly
obnoxious. We don’t find consumers strolling down the aisles of supermarkets
consulting a utility function to maximize when making their choices, nor do we
typically think of business executives being guided completely and solely (or
even mainly) by the effect of their decisions on business profits.20
Despite its common-sense roots, standard economic theory is just too sterile, the claim goes, to
capture the full range of motivations behind human behavior. Real people aren’t much like
Homo economicus, so the latter makes a poor model for the former.
The second area of criticism points to the empirical shortcomings of orthodox economic
theory: its predictions often fail to come true. There are a host of situations where people behave
in ways that seem to be inconsistent with subjective expected utility maximization. Take, for
example, the famous Allais paradox, which was the first well-known case to cast doubts on
rational choice accounts.
Problem 1. Choose between options A and B: A pays $2500 with probability
0.33, $2400 with probability 0.66, and $0 with probability 0.01; B pays $2400
with probability 1.
Problem 2. Choose between options C and D: C pays $2500 with probability 0.33
and $0 with probability 0.67; D pays $2400 with probability 0.34 and $0 with
probability 0.66.21
In Problem 1, A is preferred to B if and only if 0.33u($2500) + 0.66u($2400) + 0.01u($0) >
u($2400), i.e., u($0) > 34u($2400) - 33u($2500). Likewise, in Problem 2, C is preferred to D if
and only if 0.33u($2500) + 0.67u($0) > 0.34u($2400) + 0.66u($0), i.e. u($0) > 34u($2400) -

20

DAVID KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 4 (1990).
This treatment of the case follows Sudgen. See Robert Sudgen, How People Choose, in THE THEORY OF
CHOICE, 27, 37 (Shaun Hargreaves Heap ed., 1992). The case originally comes from Maurice Allais, Le
comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l'école américaine, 21
ECONOMETRICA 503 (1953).
21
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33u($2500). A person who chooses A and D together, or B and C together, therefore behaves in
a way that is inconsistent with utility theory. In experiments involving these sorts of problems,
however, most subjects choose B and C together.22
There is also evidence that people switch their preferences over outcomes when those
outcomes are described in different ways. The following result from Kahneman and Tversky is
representative.
Problem 1 …: Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. …
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people
will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. …
Which of the two programs would you favor? …
Problem 2 …: Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
If program C is adopted, 400 people will die. …
If program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will
die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die. …
Which of the two programs would you favor?23
Program A in Problem 1 and program C in Problem 2 are indistinguishable in real terms, as are
program B in Problem 1 and program D in Problem 2. By measuring the outcomes of the
programs in terms of the number of lives saved, Problem 1 adopts as an implicit reference point a
situation where the disease has already taken its toll of 600 lives. In Problem 2, however, the

22
23

See Sudgen, supra note 21, at 37.
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 343 (1984).
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program outcomes are measured by the number of lives lost, which implies a reference state
where no one has yet died of the disease. When given these “two” problems (with a few other
problems in between to cleanse their palates), a clear majority of respondents preferred option A
in the first problem (72%) and option D in the second (78%). In this case, people are risk averse
when the problem is described in terms of gains and risk seeking when it is described in terms of
losses.

But according to subjective expected utility theory, when counting lives (as with

anything else), ((x-600)+200) = (x-400), so u((x-600)+200) = u(x-400) also holds. Likewise,
(1/3((x-600)+600)+2/3(x-600))

=

(1/3x+2/3(x-600)),

so

u(1/3((x-600)+600)+2/3(x-600))

=

u(1/3x+2/3(x-600)) should also follow. These equalities, combined with the experimental data,
lead to the absurd conclusion that u((x-600)+200) > u(1/3((x-600)+600)+2/3(x-600)) =
u(1/3x+2/3(x-600)) > u(x-400) = u((x-600)+200). Something is clearly amiss!24
There is evidence of exactly these sorts of description-dependent preferences in the stock
market. Standard economic theory holds that you should sell a stock if you think it will fall in
price and keep it if you think it will rise, regardless of the purchase price (a sunk cost). There is
evidence, however, of a disposition effect—people will hold on to losing stocks longer than they
hold on to winning stocks, even when the rate of return on the unsold losers was smaller than the
rate of rate of return on the winners after sale. On an aggregate scale, the trading volume of
winning stocks is higher than that for losing stocks.25 It appears that people are more willing to
gamble on their losers turning around than on their winners staying on track. Preference changes
resulting from what are merely different descriptions or sunk costs are obviously a serious
issue—common sense or not, utility theory is in trouble if it doesn’t explain behavior. None of

24

See id. at 343.
See Terrance Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? 53 J. FIN. 1775-1798 (1998); Colin
Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 288, 290-91
(Daniel Kahhneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
25
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this evidence, by the way, surprises the “sniff test” critics: if utility theory misses determinants of
behavior, empirical inadequacy is to be expected.
Partisans of behavioral economics in the field of law incorporate elements of both
criticisms. Standard economic models, they argue, naïvely focus on Homo economicus rather
than real people. Real people are not self-maximizing automatons, but instead can be said to
display bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.26 Cass Sunstein goes
a step further, and explicitly appeals to norms and roles in order to replace preferences in
explaining certain behaviors in a legal context.27 The argument here is that standard economics
involves fundamental misdescriptions of people and their motivations.
The primary criticism, however, focuses on empirical difficulties. For example, legal
scholars appeal to evidence of description-dependent evaluation in order to explain why
bargaining doesn’t replace court judgments to a greater extent than it does.28 People seem riskaverse when they see a situation as a potential significant gain and risk-loving when they see it as
a potential significant loss. Since defendants are likely to see themselves as potential losers (and
plaintiffs often see themselves as potential losers from the standpoint of their pre-injury status),
litigants (sometimes on both sides) are often willing to “roll the dice” on a trial.29 Traditional
law and economics also holds that people should ignore sunk costs and that resources should be

26

Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998).
27
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 139
(Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
28
See Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1497-1504; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 11031113 (2000).
29
The Framing Theory of litigation holds that litigants treat their current asset positions as their reference
points for evaluating gains and losses. Plaintiffs, as potential gainers are modeled as risk-averse; defendants, as
potential losers, are modeled as risk-loving. See Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of
Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996); Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000). This account might underestimate the barriers to settlement since a plaintiff may frame
her decision from the standpoint prior to (perceived) injury.
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used for their most profitable purposes. The upshot is supposed to be that entitlements in the law
will have little effect on the ultimate allocation of resources, at least where transaction costs are
low. The empirical evidence shows, however, that past expenditures do influence behavior and
that people aren’t willing to part with resources, even at a price they wouldn’t be willing to pay
to obtain the resource in the first place.30 The successes of the standard theory turn out to be the
special cases—it is only in contexts where professionals engage in repeated trades and arbitrage
is possible that incentive structures minimize the influence of human boundedness.31
Standard economic theory has some obvious answers to “sniff test” problems. As a
formalization of common sense, economic theory has resources for rebutting the charge that it
neglects intuitively plausible behavioral inputs. It doesn’t, for example, ignore compulsions or
social norms and roles. Rather, it adopts the common-sense view that such factors influence
what an agent wants, and so her preferences. While notions like utility are admittedly foreign to
common sense, it doesn’t follow that they are inconsistent with it. Utility is just a mathematical
representation of preferences, and so it ultimately reflects a person’s desires. People can want all
sorts of things, including states of affairs that appeal to their conceptions of fairness or justice.32
So, as Richard Posner notes, economic theory has no trouble accommodating “bounded selfinterest” of the sort that describes people’s propensity to look beyond their own narrowlydefined interests and act in ways that appear to promote fairness. 33 In fact, it is pretty absurd to
think of the human capacity to have interests that aren’t self-centered as a bound in the first

30

See Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1482-1485, 1497.
See id. at 1485-1486.
32
Ethical rules that serve as “side-constraints” on behavior (e.g., Kant’s Categorical Imperative) are not
ipso facto irrational.
33
See Posner, supra note 4, at 1553-55; 1557-58.
31
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place. Only someone trapped in the mindset of ethical hedonism could count the existence of
plural values as a limit.
With respect to the formal apparatus of rational choice accounts, it is clear that people
(even most economists) don’t consciously maximize subjective expected utility. It does not
follow, however, that standard economic theory is a failure, for introspective access is not a
necessary component of a behavioral theory.34 Most of us, for example, can make pretty fine
discriminations among smells, but we don’t have even the faintest idea how we do it. A
hypothesis naturally suggested by this sort of reflection is that economic models are like
perceptual models in that both are abstract (even partial) characterizations of mental processes.35
This sort of account treats subjective preferences and probabilities as important inputs to action,
even when they aren’t the sole motivating forces.
Economists, though, generally avoid this sort of account. They prefer, instead, to take an
instrumentalist line: what matters is predictive success rather than accurately describing
behavioral mechanisms. Instrumentalism about economic theory is a response, in part, to “sniff
test” objections. “People aren’t like that” isn’t a relevant complaint against a predictive tool. It
is also motivated, however, by a desire to steer clear of psychological claims. 36 In fact, given
that much of the problematic data stems from relatively small-scale psychological studies, they
would rather steer clear of individual-level claims about behavior altogether. The instrumentalist
position holds that economics models get human behavior right in the aggregate, regardless of

34

If it were, behavioral economics would also fail—most people don’t introspect their bounded rationality
or bounded willpower.
35
See, e.g., Stephen Ellis, What Economists (and Everyone Else) Should Think About Utility Theory, 18
S.W. PHIL. REV. 93 (2002); Posner, supra note 15, at 356.
36
This desire is motivated, in part, by theoretical scruples about unobservable entities. See ALEXANDER
ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 79-81 (1995).
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what actually motivates the behavior.37 Even if most individuals fail to maximize subjective
expected utility, instrumental economics should correctly predict aggregate behavior where
deviations from maximization are random. The standard line in economics is that it can tell you
about the net effect of incentives on groups of people.38
An instrumentalist theory is a tool that takes information about certain accessible
variables as an input and outputs a prediction, usually about the future state of those same
variables. Taken straight, economic models involve the mental states of particular individuals.
In order to use them as predictive tools, one must first specify the relevant accessible inputs.
Instrumentalism rides on the coattails of the normative economic theory here. Economists
usually treat the objective probabilities of a situation—what beliefs are directed at—as the
subjective probabilities of relevant agents, and actual choices—what desires are supposed to
order—as “revealed” preferences. Interpreting economic theory in this way insulates it, to some
extent, from counter-evidence. The failure of particular individuals to maximize subjective
expected utility is not important if the theory doesn’t say anything about the behavior of
individuals, much less their psychological mechanisms. Given the aggregative character of
economic instrumentalism, even systematic failures can be chalked up to adverse selection of the
sample studied from the larger population. If behavior in a certain population is distributed
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See KREPS, supra note 20, at 4-5.
See POSNER, supra note 4, at 18; Posner, supra note 4, at 1556-1557. The locus classicus of this view is
supposed to be Milton Friedman’s 1953 paper, The Methodology of Positive Economics (reprinted in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS (Daniel Hausman ed., 1990)). Friedman does appear to endorse a purely
instrumentalist account: “The ultimate goal . . . is the development of a ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’ that yields valid and
meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet observed.” Id. at 213. A closer reading,
however, suggests a more nuanced view. His basic point is that a good economic theory “abstracts the common and
crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained
and permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone.” Id. at 218. Thus, Friedman’s main point is that the
empirical evidence (as opposed to intuitive judgment) determines which abstractions from the actual mechanisms
are appropriate, not that any attention to mechanisms is irrelevant. “Complete ‘realism’ is clearly unattainable, and
the question whether a theory is realistic ‘enough’ can be settled only by seeing whether it yields predictions that are
good enough for the purpose at hand.” Id. at 237; see also id. at 219-21, 225-27.
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around a mean of rational action, it will be possible to select more and less rational subsets of
agents.39
Despite the fact that it is rarely mentioned, the insulation from counter-evidence provided
by standard economic instrumentalism clearly comes at a price.

Where there is adverse

selection, economic models are likely to make bad predictions because a (sub)set of irrational
agents won’t act in the way they suggest. Posner, to his credit, admits that this is a problem for
rational choice accounts of criminal behavior: “If the [criminal justice] system is designed to
deter, then criminals—the part of the population that is not deterred—will not be a random draw
from the population, just as lunatics are not a random draw. We can expect the undeterrable to
have peculiar traits, including, in a system in which punishment takes the form of imprisonment,
an abnormal indifference to future consequences.”40
Interpreting economic models instrumentally also puts a lot of pressure on their
predictive adequacy.

A non-instrumental model might plausibly claim to represent certain

features of a situation even if those features are being overwhelmed in that circumstance.
Feathers and bowling balls don’t fall at the same rate in most actual circumstances, but it doesn’t
follow that simple models of gravitational attraction are false. Likewise, perhaps, the actions of
very tired or very hurried agents may not conform to the predictions of consumer theory. An
instrumental model of aggregate behavior that has empirical problems has no such intuitive
plausibility to fall back on. And, on balance, the empirical evidence suggests that that economic
theory is not up to the predictive task it is assigned. It doesn’t, at least so far¸ account for much
of the phenomena of interest to economists, orthodox or behavioral. Regardless of whether some
standard model could account for the behavioral evidence, currently available models don t. As

39
40

See Posner, supra note 4, at 1561, 1570-1571.
See id. at 1568.
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a tool, then, standard economic theory fails to predict as much of the relevant phenomena as we
would like.
The problems encountered by standard economic theory should come as no surprise. It
is, after all, based on common sense intuitions, and common sense can lead us astray. “Folk”
accounts are often flawed—“folk physics,” for example, has heavier objects falling faster than
lighter objects. Even if the core “folk” account is on track, there is usually much more to be said
(e.g., a good physical theory still must account for the difference between feathers and bowling
balls). Everyone who thinks seriously about economic issues recognizes the need to adapt
economic models to handle anomalous behavior.
Orthodox economics tries to preserve the basic structure of subjective expected utility
maximization and account for recalcitrant behavior by either finding new inputs into the old
models that account for the empirical results (e.g., new motives, more complex beliefs about
circumstances) or applying the old models in novel ways (e.g., “multiple person” models,
evolutionary psychology). The first strategy does successfully fend off certain challenges. Some
apparent difficulties are resolved by paying more attention to the objects of preference. It isn’t
anomalous for someone to drink Folgers most of the time, even when she claims to prefer
Starbucks.

We recognize that Folgers-flavor vs. Starbucks-flavor isn’t the only relevant

dimension to her choice: a cup of Folgers costs $0.75, while Starbucks runs $2 per cup.
Likewise, there is no anomaly if someone who usually buys a cheap candy bar on the way to the
movies pays the inflated theater price when she is on a date. Paying full price can send a signal
about her attitude toward money that she wants to send.41 There is a plausible response to the

41

The candy bar case is due to an example by David Friedman:
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Allais paradox that runs along these lines.

The most popular choices are supposed to be

inconsistent because an agent chooses B in Problem 1 if and only if u($0) < 34u($2400) 33u($2500) and C in Problem 2 if and only if u($0) > 34u($2400) - 33u($2500). For many
people, however, the $0 outcome in Problem 1 is accompanied by regret—“Oh God, I just blew
a sure $2400”—in a way that the $0 outcome in Problem 2 is not. There is nothing inconsistent
about choosing B and C if u($0 & regret) < 34u($2400) - 33u($2500) and if u($0 and no regret)
> 34u($2400) - 33u($2500). In each of the foregoing cases, the inaccurate prediction is the result
of an insensitive modeler missing some feature of the situation to which the agent is responding.
Most attempts to safeguard economic theory from empirical counter-evidence follow this
strategy.

They point to some extra structure in the difficult cases—such as sophisticated

preferences or beliefs, information asymmetry, signaling, or strategic behavior—that changes the
application of standard economic tools.42
Still, the “new inputs” strategy has some important limits. Initially, the extra attention to
(beliefs about) circumstances, motives, and the like doesn’t make much sense unless they are
thought of as real features of situations. A plausible instrumentalist model must appeal to
accessible inputs. Appeal to beliefs or motives that aren’t apparent in the circumstances would

[C]onsider someone who has a choice between two identical products at different prices. It seems
that for almost any objective we can think of, he would prefer to buy the less expensive item. …
But suppose you are taking a date to a movie. You know you are going to want a candy bar,
which costs $1.00 in the theater and $0.50 in the Seven-Eleven grocery store you pass on your
way there. Do you stop at the store and buy a candy bar?
DAVID FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE TEXT 3 (1990). Friedman thinks that the only conclusion
licensed by economic theory is yes. He recognizes, of course, that you might not: “Do you want your date to think
you are a tightwad? You buy the candy bar at the theater, impressing your date (you hope) with the fact that you are
the sort of person who does not have to worry about money.” Id. Standard economic theory, he thinks, just fails in
this instance. Does this case really tell against economic theory? Obviously not, for the reasons outlined above.
See Ellis, supra note 35, at 97-98.
42
Again, there are costs to this approach. Complicating the application of economic theory means that one
must abandon some of its straight-forward recommendations. For example, the Coase theorem depends on the
existence of a certain sort of simple market, one without strategic behavior. See, e.g., Deirdre McClosky, The SoCalled Coase Theorem, 24 E. ECON. J. 367 (1998).
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be completely ad hoc.43 Further, it usually takes an agent who is actually rational to signal or
otherwise engage in strategic behavior. This sort of realism stands in direct opposition to the
instrumentalist interpretation of models adopted by most economists. The standard focus on
aggregate behavior in economics is also an uncomfortable fit with the “new inputs” strategy. A
set of agents who are merely rational on average probably can’t support sophisticated strategic
applications of standard economic theory. Again, only individually rational agents can perform
most strategic behavior.
Finally, the “new inputs” approach just doesn’t handle some of the important cases. The
empirical evidence does provide some decisive objections to economic theory. There are some
fairly simple cases where economic models fail despite the lack of any complicating
environmental structures. Appeal to hidden complexity in the world is no help with the Asian
Disease case, for example. The outcomes of programs A and C are literally identical, as are the
outcomes of programs B and D—only the terms used to describe them differ. There are no
asymmetries in the case for a modeler to miss. Rather, agents seem to irrationally distinguish
cases that aren’t actually different. There isn’t any room for this in standard economic theory.44
This sort of failure also lends credence to the view that (yet-to-be-discovered) situational
complexity might not be the best explanation for the more complicated apparent failures of
economic theory. If there is clear evidence that people systematically treat gains and losses
differently in this case, then appeal to this sort of differential treatment is plausible in the
disposition-effect cases and the lack-of-bargaining-around-judgments cases.

43

This fact accounts for David Friedman’s reluctance to distinguish between a candy bar on a date and a
candy bar alone.
44
For more cases where economic theory clearly fails, see section II below.
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The second strategy—applying the old models in novel ways—is woefully
underdeveloped. “Multiple selves” accounts haven’t been studied in any serious way. 45 Even a
cursory examination, however, raises some serious issues about the basic account of preferences
at the heart of economic theory. The main problem is understanding the relations among the
different “selves.” If we take the metaphor seriously, intrapersonal dynamics are at least as
complicated as interpersonal dynamics.

It has been argued, for example, that there are

intrapersonal versions of the prisoner’s dilemma and Arrow’s theorem.46 Shifting to a “multiple
selves” view would require seriously rethinking a host of issues. 47 At any rate, the standard
prescriptions of law and economics presuppose univocal agents. The claim that legal rules
maximize allocative efficiency, for example, takes for granted that the agents before the bar are
the same agents whose behavior led to the court case in the first place.
Appeal to evolutionary psychology amounts to a surrender to behavioral economics.
While evolutionary theory does use mathematical models that are quite similar to economic
models, the “agent” in those models is nature, not the creatures that evolve.48 Nature “chooses”
creatures that maximize her goal of inclusive fitness. It doesn’t follow that those creatures are
maximizers at all (think of insects), much less maximizers that share nature’s goal of inclusive
fitness. Evolutionary psychology suggests, rather, that people will be well adapted to their
ancestral environments, not universal problems solvers. In fact, relatively narrow behavioral
rules are likely to provide lower cost solutions to ecological challenges, at least where there is
some environmental stability. Prominent advocates of evolutionary psychology tell us that

45

Such accounts have, however, been put forth as a method of explaining such phenomena as hyperbolic
discounting. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 19.
46
See Gregory Kavka, Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?, 7 ECON. & PHIL.
143, 148-53, 157-60 (1991).
47
For an overview of these issues, see Ellis, supra note 7.
48
Creatures are nature’s strategies on these accounts.
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human behavior is driven by a grab-bag of ecologically rational heuristics rather than an allpurpose process of utility maximization.49 At a minimum, we should expect evolved beings to
care about a variety of things other than inclusive fitness.50 All of this assumes that evolutionary
psychology, as it is currently understood, is an accurate account, which is far from established.
There is little doubt that mental activity is underwritten in crucial ways by brains, and further,
that brains, as bodily organs, are subject to evolutionary pressures. It isn’t at all clear, however,
exactly how brains underwrite minds. Likewise, we don’t know very much about the crucial
details of human ancestral environments. As a result, we just don’t have any good idea about
how selection pressures have influenced human thought. Most of the accounts offered by
evolutionary psychologists have some plausibility, but none has really established itself as
likely.51
The upshot is that things don’t look good for standard economic approaches. While they
have their virtues, they also confront a number of cases that they can’t explain, and they don’t
seem to have the resources needed to expand their explanatory reach. But all may not be lost:
perhaps solutions to the difficult cases can be found in behavioral economics.

II. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
Behavioral economics is explicitly an attempt to overcome the deficiencies of standard
economics. This approach accepts the normative appeal of economic theory—people should
maximize their subjective expected utility. It recognizes, however, that there are empirical

49

See, e.g., PETER M. TODD & GERD GIGERENZER, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (2000).
See, e.g., ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON (1988); JOHN TOOBEY, LEILA COSMIDES & JEROME
BARKOW, THE ADAPTED MIND (1995).
51
See, e.g., Jerry Fodor, The Trouble with Psychological Darwinism, 20 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS (1998);
Jerry Fodor, The Selfish Gene Pool, TIMES LITERARY SUPP. (July 27, 2005).
50
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difficulties with economic models, and posits that those problems are not the result of random
noise, but rather follow from behavioral regularities.

Behavioral economics modifies the

structure of economic theory in order to capture those regularities and come up with adequate
descriptive models.52 While the data about anomalous behavior receives most of the attention in
the behavioral law and economics literature,53 behavioral economists themselves develop
structural models that are meant to capture this data. These models retain the basic structure of
economic theory while replacing simple accounts of subjective probabilities and utilities with
more psychologically plausible (but still mathematically tractable) alternatives.
In its current state, behavioral economics appears scattered. A glance at one of the basic
articles or defining collections of essays shows it to be a grab bag of empirical findings that have
little relationship with each other (though they all stand in opposition to some tenet of traditional
economics). Each new empirical falsification of an economic assumption gives rise to a new
behavioral model, or at least a new modification of standard economic models. There are some
efforts to impose order on these investigations. Prospect theory, for example, unites in one
model changes that attempt to account for what appear to be the disparate phenomena of
52

That behavioral economics is after better descriptive adequacy is clear in virtually every article on the
topic. It is equally clear that behavioral economists accept the normative appeal of standard accounts. By treating
anomalous actions as errors, they are buying into the norm of standard economics. Behavioral economics began
when “cognitive scientists … took maximization of utilities and logical rules of probability judgments as
benchmarks and used conformity or deviation from these benchmarks as a way to theorize about cognitive
mechanisms (much as optical illusions are used to understand perception).” Colin Camerer, Behavioral Economics:
Reunifying Psychology and Economics, 96 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 10575 (1999); see also Jolls et al., supra
note 26, at 1473-74, 1487, 1523-45; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 221 SCI. 453, 458 (1981); Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality
Debate, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. (2002); A. Peter McGraw, Philip E. Tetlock, & Orie Kristel, The Limits of Fungibility:
Relational Schemata and the Value of Things, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 219 (2003). Behavioral economists sometimes
claim that “dysfunctional effects within one framework will often look functional in another.” Philip E. Tetlock &
Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 98 (2002). This, however, hardly amounts to
throwing off the norms of standard economic theory (which, after all are a subset of the norms of common sense).
Given their views about human capacities, it isn’t surprising that behavioral economists offer different prescriptions
than orthodox economists. Both sets of prescriptions, however, are aimed at the same ideal – actions that optimally
satisfy desires.
53
See Posner, supra note 4, at 1558-61.
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endowment effects and overemphasis on low probability events.

And, somewhat less

persuasively, the behavioral phenomena to be explained are grouped together in categories such
as bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.54

But on balance,

behavioral economics comes across as a collection of insights into what appear to be almost
wholly distinct psychological phenomena.
Prospect Theory merits close attention since it is the most well developed behavioral
model. Amos Kahneman and Daniel Tversky explicitly formulated it as an empirically superior
alternative to Subjective Expected Utility Maximization.55 They were impressed, in particular,
by the evidence of endowment effects and description-dependent preferences.

In order to

account for this evidence, Prospect Theory replaces the utility assignments of standard theory (to
total asset positions, or, more generally, total states of affairs) with a value function that assesses
changes (in total assets, or, more generally, situations) from a reference point. People, on this
account, evaluate changes in their circumstances rather than the circumstances themselves. In
order to capture the empirical data, prospect theory directly models people as risk averse for
gains and risk loving for losses. The following figure represents the sort of value function that
results.56
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See Jolls et al., supra note 26, at 1476-79.
See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 52, at 263.
56
See id. at 279.
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Note that a material (and so value) gain can reset the reference point. From the new reference
point, an equivalent material loss will result in an even greater value loss. In order to model
reference-point-based values, Prospect Theory must account for how they are set. To do this, it
adds a framing step to the decision process. A person’s reference point is usually her current
asset position, but framing allows that her reference point can differ depending on her
expectations and how her circumstances are presented to her. In the Asian Disease case, for
example, the problems are phrased in a way that permits multiple reference points (“the outbreak
… is expected to kill 600 people”). The programs, however, imply specific reference points:
programs A and B save lives, suggesting that we should think of the 600 as already gone;
programs C and D limit loss of life, suggesting that we should think of the 600 as still with us.
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Kahneman and Tversky also see evidence that people overweight low probability events
in their decisions, so they replace the subjective probabilities of standard theory with decision
weights that capture this effect.57

For any probability p < 0.3 (or so), the decision weight π(p) > p; for probability p > 0.3 (or so),
the decision weight π(p) < p.58
While Prospect Theory is the most developed behavioral account, it isn’t the whole story.
It does, however, serve as a jumping off point for most advances in behavioral economics.
Cumulative prospect theory, for example, proposes an alternative account of (still non-linear)
decision weights. In the original Prospect Theory, the decision weights are transformed simple
probabilities. If, for example, P(x) = 0.5 then the decision weight for x is π(0.5). The cumulative
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See id. at 283.
See Camerer, supra note 25, at 288; Drazen Prelec, The Probability Weighting Function 66
ECONOMETRICA 497 (1998).
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probability of x will be P(outcome < x); the relevant decision weight for x will be w(P(outcome <
x)). This change in focus is supposed to have some advantages, but it doesn’t make much
difference in the predictions of models once the relevant weighting functions have been
calibrated with the empirical data.59 A drawback of cumulative decision weights is that they are
only well defined for outcomes that can be adequately modeled with a real valued interval (i.e.,
where it makes sense to order outcomes as greater than, less than, or equal to one another). This
requirement may turn out to be problematic, e.g., cumulative decision weights won’t be defined
over partial preference orderings.
Mental accounting, an approach pioneered by Richard Thaler, is probably the most
important extension of Prospect Theory. Starting from the insight that people evaluate gains and
losses asymmetrically, Thaler notes that the prospects being evaluated are not always well
defined. Suppose, for example, that someone goes shopping and gets one item at a deep discount
(a gain relative to her reference point) but end up paying more than expected for another item (a
loss relative to her reference point). Does she evaluate each item-transaction separately and then
aggregate those values or does she aggregate the item-transactions and then evaluate?

In

Prospect Theory, the sum of the values of two objects is not generally the same as the value of
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Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of
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those two objects together (i.e., v(x) + v(y)

v(x&y)) so whether someone thinks of the objects as

distinct prospects or parts of the same prospect will matter in how she evaluates them. 60
The details of Mental Accounting are not crucial for our purposes. Suffice it to say that
people organize “expenditures” and “credits” by type (e.g., money vs. time), topic (e.g.,
entertainment vs. cash reserves), and time-frame (e.g., gambling proceeds for the day vs. those
for the trip).

Where the categorization isn’t fixed, people seem to organize prospects for

evaluation in such a way as to maximize the aggregate amount of value experienced. According
to Mental Accounting, then, the framing step of a decision process slices up the space of
outcomes to be evaluates as well as sets up reference points for gains and losses.61
Prospect Theory and its elaborations clearly must be understood as non-aggregative, noninstrumentalist accounts.

The relatively small-scale experiments (at least compared with

markets) that provide the data for Prospect Theory are meant to isolate behavior at an individual
level. Kahneman and Tversky see this behavior as evidence of real psychological structure.62
Indeed, it would be difficult to even develop a convincing instrumentalist interpretation of
Prospect Theory. Orthodox economics can plausibly be an instrumentalist account because it
can treat environmental frequencies as subjective probabilities and actual choices as “revealed”
preferences. According to Prospect Theory, however, there is a gap between normative concepts
like preferences and beliefs on the one hand and descriptive concepts like value functions and
decision weights on the other. Given this distance, there don’t seem to be any intuitive features
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of cases themselves that can effectively serve as proxies for the apparatus of Prospect Theory.
This seems to generalize to any account that significantly diverges from orthodox economics.
Something at the individual level must actually correspond to value functions, decision weights,
etc. in order for behavioral accounts to make sense.
Behavioral economics is a fundamentally conservative approach in that it retains the basic
approaches and structures of economic theory. Its basic project is that of standard economics,
with extra concern for empirical adequacy. Like orthodox accounts, behavioral models attempt
to formalize the common sense notions of desire and belief. The value functions of Prospect
Theory, for example, attempt to capture the role normally assigned to desire just as utility
functions of standard theory try to. Likewise, the decision weights of Prospect Theory try to
regiment the role of beliefs in much the way that the subjective probabilities of standard theory
attempt to.

The only serious difference is that the functional forms of Prospect Theory

formalizations are explicitly developed with an eye toward the empirical data.
Some of these modifications proposed by behavioral theories, however, require additions
to the basic structure of provided by common sense. Since it requires a reference point in order
to categorize the gains and losses that are assessed by the value function, Prospect Theory
supplies a framing account of how reference points are set. Mental accounting requires a
framing step to account for how the space of outcomes is partitioned. While framing is not part
of the core principle of folk psychology formalized by standard economics, it isn’t foreign to
common sense. People sometimes see the glass as half empty, sometimes as half full. 63 Still,
Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, and the others don’t import much that is new. Once the reference
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More on this below!
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points are in place and the objects of evaluation are discriminated, they tend to focus on exactly
the determinants of behavior that standard economists do—what people value and believe.
Because most behavioral models attempt to formalize what is worth preserving from the
common-sense notions of desire and belief, we find evidence of behavioral economic effects
already built into legal doctrine (just as we did with standard economic theory). Take, for
example, the endowment effect, one of the more robust empirical findings that influences
behavioral economics.64 This effect describes the fact that people value items they already own
more than they would pay to acquire the same items. Such a discovery would appear to be a
novel aspect of human behavior that should quickly suggest a variety of improvements in legal
doctrine. But while there have been some suggestions along these lines,65 there have not been
nearly as many as one would have thought. Part of the reason for this, as Sam Issacharoff noted,
“is that in this area behavioral models have already been best integrated into the understanding of
legal claims.”66 The same may be said of some of the other models of behavioral economics.
Indeed, the concept of “bounded self-interest”—the fact that people tend to care more about
fairness than predicted by traditional economic models—may help explain those “anomalies” of
law and economics where judges appear to be concerned with distributional concerns as well as
allocative ones.
Behavioral economics is better than the orthodox theory, but even with respect to
empirical adequacy, it is something of a mixed bag. In the first place, it is unclear that it can
cope with the successes of standard economic theory.
64
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economists have shown that exchange markets set up with agents who know only their own
circumstances converge to the prices and allocations predicted by standard general equilibrium
analysis.67 These sorts of successes occur in the real world as well, as even the advocates of
behavioral economics admit.68 As we saw before, these advocates argue that these successes of
economic theory occur only in special circumstances. These caveats, even if accurate, are no
help, however, to behavioral models that just build the usual regularities into their core
equations. Even the discipline provided by high stakes and arbitrage opportunities is no help for
an agent if her beliefs work like the decision weights of Prospect Theory. Interaction among
behavioral agents is unlikely to result in the same outcome as interaction among standard
economic agents.

This is a problem for behavioral economics to the extent that orthodox

accounts make accurate predictions.
Obviously, Prospect Theory and its kin capture the cases they are designed to capture.
There are, however, a number of ways to account for the empirical evidence in question. Given
this fact, one might question why behavioral economists make the exact modifications to the
functional forms of standard theory that they do. There is clearly an idea that as much of
orthodox economics as possible is to be preserved, and that changes should be made only as new
behavioral anomalies appear in the data.69 This approach seems to be a hangover from standard
economic instrumentalism—if all that matters is predictive success then it makes sense to
accommodate the evidence in a direct way, without worrying too much about the underlying
psychology. Note, however, that that this sort of latent instrumentalism is quite implausible for
behavioral accounts such as Prospect Theory. Further, such a piecemeal, data-driven approach is
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troubling because of the way changes in models can interact. A modification to account for one
sort of evidence might change the way in which other evidence can be accommodated.
This sort of interference can be seen in the behavioral economic literature. Appeal to
reference-point-dependent value, for example, competes with appeal to fairness norms as the
explanation for unexpected failures to bargain around court orders.70

No model could

incorporate both Prospect-Theory-style value functions and a Sunstein-style appeal to fairness
norms: Sunstein holds that fairness norms have influence apart from mediation by preferences.71
A model with both value functions and norms mediated by preferences would have too much—
one or the other is sufficient to account for the data. Projectability is also a concern: do
behavioral accounts handle the new evidence as it comes in? The empirical work seems mixed.
James Druckerman, for example, finds that while reference-point framing effects seem to occur
in certain political contexts, they don’t occur in others. 72 The upshot is that behavioral anomalies
like the framing effect are not constant, but rather intermittent and dependent on circumstances.
Without some underlying theory telling us when the various anomalies are likely to occur, it is
difficult to piece behavioral economics into a coherent picture, much less one that can be readily
integrated with the successes of standard economics.
While those who work in law and behavioral economics readily admit the lack of a
unifying theory, they do not view this as a fatal or insurmountable problem. 73 The contrast
drawn here, as always, is with traditional economics, which they see as well-theorized but
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empirically false (at least on many occasions).74 In choosing between a complete theory that
leads to incorrect predictions and an incomplete group of psychological phenomena that, when
applied in the right context, lead to accurate predictions, it’s easy to see the appeal of behavioral
economics. Indeed, it is sometimes viewed as a version of legal pragmatism. 75 And those in law
and behavioral economics rightly caution that the discipline is still in its infancy, and express
hope that someday it will come together into a more coherent theory. 76 (That said, relatively
little work is done to further this goal; instead, most of the work tends to involve the application
of existing behavioral models to particular legal doctrines.)
But the lack of a unified theory is a serious shortcoming, especially in the context of
developing prescriptions for legal doctrine. Initially, the lack of such a theory makes it difficult
to sort out the relationships among the great (and growing) number of heuristics, biases, and
other behavioral “anomalies.” There may be multiple behavioral explanations for many types of
behavior; indeed, as noted above, this sort of problem is already springing up in the literature.
Without some theory that explains the relationships among competing models, it seems less
likely that a particular behavioral approach will gain much traction among lawmakers.
There is also a related problem: without a unified theory of behavior, it is difficult to
figure out when lawmakers should apply traditional economics and when they should apply
behavioral economics (or, if behavioral models are viewed as fine-tuning standard models, when
you fine-tune and when you leave well enough alone). Take, for example, the fact that people
value items they already own more than they would pay to acquire the same items (i.e., the
endowment effect).

Is it, as posited by behavioral economists, best modeled by Prospect
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Theory’s reference-point-dependent value functions? Or is it, according to standard accounts,
best explained by some combination of wealth effects, rational adaptation, and the absence of
close substitutes? Without a unified theory, we are not even sure that the two accounts compete
at all—perhaps the behavior is best captured by some combination of the two.
Integrating the findings of behavioral economics into a more unified theory of behavior
would go a long way toward persuading both legal academics and, ultimately, policymakers of
their importance. A large part of Richard Posner’s critique of behavioral economics is that it is
“undertheorized.”77 Other legal academics, though less wedded to traditional law and economics
methods, make a similar point.78 Policymakers, too, will be reluctant to jump on board without
some principled way of mediating among behavioral models. The law, after all, is a collection of
fairly general rules of widespread applicability. While some tailoring is obviously possible,
there are limits. And, given the current state of behavioral economics, it may well be that most
policymakers choose to stay with the status quo (the status quo bias at work!).
The root of the problem, though, may not be that behavioral economics is undertheorized in some way. Behavioral economics, after all, is as capable of forming models to
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handle cases as standard economics. The problem, rather, is that behavioral models are undermotivated. The fact that standard models don’t handle the empirical evidence is good reason to
alter those models, but the alterations themselves are pretty simple-minded.

Behavioral

economists often fail to draw a distinction between empirical evidence and what it is evidence
for. If, for example, the data suggest an endowment effect, the behavioral approach treats that
effect as a brute fact, building it into the core apparatus of the model without any further ado.
This sort of “curve fitting” approach accepts without question that standard economic models are
both normatively attractive and in the right neighborhood of the causal mechanisms of behavior.
This, in turn, suggests a certain diagnosis of the problems with standard economic theory: we
know what people are supposed to do, but there are flaws in the design that implements the
plan.79
Behavioral economics, then, lets standard economic theory set the agenda: it discusses
exactly the elements of common sense that standard theory discusses; it (mostly) leaves out what
standard theory leaves out.

Both the source and the failures of economic theory suggest,

however, that this approach should at least be questioned. Economic theory is abstracted from
folk psychology. If it has problems, it is at least a live possibility that the abstraction was
deficient. This point is more urgent when it becomes clear that behavioral economics is prey to
similar failures.
Like orthodox accounts, behavioral models hold that behavior reflects all of an agent’s
wants, interests, values, etc. The gains and losses that value functions in Prospect Theory assess
are, for example, overall gains and losses concerning the prospect at hand. There is, however,
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evidence of human “tunnel vision” that suggests people often act on a proper subset of the values
they hold. Some behavioral phenomena are, therefore, beyond the reach of even behavioral
economics.
Consider, for example, an experience of George Orwell in the Spanish Civil War.80
Orwell had gone out to snipe at Fascists. He saw an easy target—a fleeing enemy soldier
holding up his trousers as he ran—but he couldn’t shoot because “a man who is holding up his
trousers isn’t a ‘Fascist’, he is visibly a fellow-creature, similar to yourself, and you don’t feel
like shooting at him.”81 Orwell knew, of course, that the man was still a Fascist, but he didn’t
see him that way. He also realized that others he had fired at (both before and after this incident)
were fellow-creatures, but he did see them as Fascists and he shot with resolve if not relish.82
Something recognizable as framing seems to be going on here—before Orwell decided
whether to shoot, he focused in on certain aspects of his situation rather than others. But this
clearly isn’t framing as Prospect Theory understands it—there aren’t any reference point issues
here. Orwell seemed to hold two relevant principles: it is generally wrong to kill others and it is
generally right to stop the spread of Fascism. We expect someone to who volunteers to serve in
an armed conflict to come to an understanding about how such principles fit together. Orwell,
for example, (usually) seemed to think that stopping the spread of Fascism was crucial enough to
allow some compromise on his principle against killing. Standard economics starts with these
sorts of overall evaluations—an act of killing has a utility assignment, all (factual and
motivational) things considered. Behavioral economics follows the same line. Whether some
action counts as a net gain or loss is determined by the whole person’s motivational structure.
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Mental accounting does nothing to change this since it only addresses what the basic objects of
evaluation are, not how they get evaluated. In the case at hand, however, Orwell seems to have
lost contact with his usual overall evaluation. He wasn’t able to understand (frame) his situation
as one where he was shooting a Fascist; he had “tunnel-vision” on the humanity of his intended
victim.
Economists of all stripes are likely to write off Orwell’s case as a psychological anomaly,
but this is a mistake. Attention is at least as bounded as rationality or willpower. On reflection,
it should be obvious that people rarely reflect on all of their values or beliefs when they act.
Steve doesn’t consider all of the implicated values when he goes to the snack machine at work
(although he probably should). Rather, he feels a twinge of hunger that distracts him from the
task at hand and he acts to satisfy that hunger with no real thought to the costs.
There is a similar story of “tunnel-vision” at the very foundation of economics. One of
the stylized facts about markets is that they lead people to act on bottom line considerations, i.e.,
to get money, products, services, etc. In the marketplace, people act for personal gain; other
values are reflected only in what they do with those gains. Both critics and advocates of markets
generally agree that they lead people to focus on bottom line issues, at least in certain contexts.
They disagree only about whether this is a good thing.83 Markets are thought to have this effect
because of the way economic incentives work: acting on non-market values is costly; market
competition drives out high-cost competitors.
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This story can’t be right, however, at least in many cases. As we saw before, people care
about a variety of issues, including many that aren’t self-focused. According to economic
theory, orthodox or behavioral, markets should reflect this fact. If consumers really care about,
say, labor rights or avoiding racial “inferiors,” they should be willing to pay to further those
goals. Entrepreneurs, then, should compete to satisfy the demand for products that advance these
goals (e.g., labor-friendly shoes, Caucasian-produced bread). Niche marketing of this sort exists,
of course, but it is relatively rare. While markets certainly haven’t eradicated racism, or any
other non-pecuniary value, people do tend to focus on narrowly “economic” considerations when
they do things like make purchases or hire workers. The standard economic picture, one shared
by both orthodox and behavioral accounts, has it that people act from their whole minds. The
common evidence of human tunnel vision strongly suggests that this picture is inadequate.
The upshot is that things don’t look much better for behavioral economic approaches than
they do for standard approaches. While they have their virtues, behavioral models also confront
a number of cases that they can’t explain and they don’t seem to have the resources needed to
expand their explanatory reach. While both standard and behavioral economics formalize certain
central aspects of common sense, there are other aspects that they leave out. There are resources
in those other aspects that can be exploited to handle some data. Sometimes, for example, we
explain behavior by holding that people are overwhelmed by emotion. Likewise, we explain
some behavior by holding that people are distracted from important information. The difficulties
encountered by both orthodox and behavioral economics suggest, at least, that it would pay to
look again at the original regimentation of common sense to see if there is anything worthwhile
that was left out. Such a reexamination can provide insights for both normative and descriptive
models of behavior.
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III. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF BEHAVIOR
When attempting to develop a more unified theory of behavior, it makes sense to begin
by asking whether there are any features that are common to the great variety of behavioral
anomalies.

One candidate is the importance of context.84

The phenomena catalogued by

behavioral economists often turn on a change in the context of the action or decision at issue (or,
to be more precise, they turn on a change in the subject’s apprehension of the situation). The
subjects of prospect-theory experiments, for example, respond differently to situations involving
perceived gains and those involving perceived losses. Indeed, the highly contextual nature of
many of the behavioral effects is one of the things that makes them so difficult to pin down and,
ultimately, operationalize into law.

Thus we are told by scholars of law and behavioral

economics that, without an overarching theory, the key to developing useful legal commands in
any given circumstance involves “due regard for the relevant decision-making capabilities of the
actors in that specific setting.”85
But it is not merely a change in context that gives rise to the cases that cause so much
trouble for standard economic theory.

A new situation often presents a person with new

information, and clearly that information can change the person’s underlying beliefs or
ultimately even her desires. Standard economics, however, can easily handle such changes.
What standard economics cannot do is accommodate changes in context that are unaccompanied
by changes in underlying beliefs and desires and nonetheless prompt different actions. Thus, our
84
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reexamination of commonsense psychology should be with an eye to finding a way to build the
context of human action back into our motivational theory.
The observation that actions take place in specific contexts is not new. It has long been
recognized that a person is disposed to act in a situation that poses a particular problem
(challenge, opportunity, etc.), and that she responds to the problem by trying to solve it.86
Aristotle provides a simple example: “I want to drink, says appetite; this is drink, says sense or
imagination or thought: straightaway I drink.”87 In this case, some situation prompts the agent’s
thirst, such as heat or exercise. A person can be thirsty, of course, without paying much attention
to that fact. Here, however, she does pay attention. The agent’s view of her situation activates
her desire for a drink. Her perception of her circumstance brings thirst to the fore, making it
seem like a problem. The agent operates in the context of her problem. She sees that she can do
something about her thirst—take a drink—and so she does. Note that Aristotle’s agent still has
many other reasons—she wants to give a sacrifice, finish a tragedy, etc.—but in this situation she
acts on her thirst. Common sense tells us, then, that only a part of a person’s preference structure
might be “on line” at any given time. People have a limited capacity for comprehending their
environments. As a result, their attention is selective.88
Frederic Schick, in a series of articles and books over the last two decades, has developed
an addition to the standard folk psychological account of action that captures role of perceived
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circumstances in causing actions.89 He calls desire-belief pairs grounds.90 Grounds are potential
reasons for actions. Each of us has grounds for a number of incompatible actions. A particular
ground is activated, and so leads to action, in virtue of the person’s understanding of her
situation. 91 In Aristotle’s case, the agent’s ground for drinking (and not her other grounds) is
activated by her understanding that thirst is her problem now, not her religious duties or her play
deadline. She acts to satisfy only that desire. A person has one understanding at a time—the one
implicit in the mental states she is actually using. This understanding cannot always be simply
characterized, of course. It might involve more than one dominant theme, e.g., someone might
understand a situation in terms of both loyalty and justice. Compound understandings of this sort
involve as elements considerations that might constitute separate understandings on their own. A
complex understanding activates a particular ground only when the agent sees as her objective
the object of the desire component of the ground.92
Thinking about understandings helps us see that reasons aren't necessarily overall
evaluations of the sort that utility or value functions are supposed to provide in standard
economic or prospect theory, respectively. There are often interests (contained in unactivated
grounds) that aren’t considered. How is partial evaluation sufficient to support an action? An
activated ground shows that a course of action is desirable insofar as it advances toward the
objective the agent actually considers. Given her understanding, she doesn’t see anything to give
her pause before acting. This insight leads Schick to develop a three-part theory of reasons. If a
person has grounds for an action and she understands her circumstances in a way that activates
89
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exactly the mental states that make up those grounds, then she does the action. Schematically, if
a person (1) wants A; (2) believes both that A only if B and B is available; and (3) understands as
her situation as one where (a) the realization of A is her objective, i.e., the desire for A is the only
one activated; (b) making B true is a means to or way of making A true, i.e., the belief that A only
if B is activated; and (c) some option realizes B, i.e., the belief that B is available is activated,
then she does B. If someone has a ground for an action and she uses exactly the mental states
that make up that ground to think about her situation, then the action suggested by that ground
will (in the absence of external restraint or infirmity) ensue—no other considerations that could
derail the transition from desire to action are active.93
It is hard to say what makes some features salient and others not in a given situation. Of
course, we don’t need to know the full story for the purposes of this paper—we’re suggesting a
line of inquiry, not a finished account. Folk psychology tells us enough, however, to convince us
that this line is worth pursuing. To have a certain understanding is to represent a situation with
certain propositions involving certain properties. Attitudes toward those propositions are thereby
activated and so employed in reasoning. Other propositions involving those properties are likely
to spring to mind as well, activating desires and beliefs that involve them. We might believe of
someone, for example, that he sees her action as a threat to his masculinity. The person in
question sees the circumstances surrounding her action and his response through the lens of his
masculinity: that consideration looms large in his thinking. His beliefs about manliness, his
desire to protect his own manliness, considerations involving the relationship between
93
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masculinity and other aspects of his self-image, etc. come to mind when he thinks about his
situation and so they will guide his actions. 94
Appeal to understandings is part, albeit a neglected part, of our common-sense
psychology. Reflection on our everyday thoughts reveals the role that understandings play.
When I see a child in trouble, for example, I don’t think about my own monetary gain, despite
the fact that I might be able to make some money in that circumstance. Likewise, I rarely think
about the harm I might do others when I drive. I think rather about where I am going and what
I’ll do when I get there. We already know, in some sense, that we can affect the actions of others
by framing their options in certain ways, i.e., by bringing to mind certain propositions rather than
others. Understandings play a familiar, if unheralded, role in our everyday thinking about
behavior.
It is fairly easy to adapt economic theory to accommodate Schick’s insights about
understandings. Standard consumer theory starts with preferences. It doesn’t say anything,
however, about how these preferences result from an agent’s various interests. Let us suppose
that each of a person’s basic goals induces an interval ranking of actions. People act on subsets
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of their mental states, so they attend to only some of their basic interest rankings and some of
their beliefs. In any circumstance, the behavior-relevant probability weights are those that are
conditioned on salient beliefs and the action-guiding expected utilities are importance weighted
sums of the (numerical representations of the) rankings of salient desires.
The formal account is simple but a bit tedious. Let A = {ai | ai is an action that the agent
thinks she can perform}; D = {d | d is a basic desire}; Rd is the binary preference relation over A
provided by desire d ∈ D. aiRdaj means that ai is at least as good as aj with respect to desire d.
Each Rd is complete and transitive. A function ud: A → ℜ (the real numbers) gives an expected
utility assignment that numerical represents Rd such that ud(ai) ≥ ud(aj) iff aiRdaj. Each ud(⋅) is
unique only up to positive linear transformation. Schick’s idea, in brief, is that people can be
motivated by different proper subsets of their desires in different situations. What follows is a
way to build this idea into formal economic models. Let N = {N | N is a situation}; C = {Rd | Rd
for d ∈ D} is the set of preference rankings provided by someone’s basic desires; Pow(C) = {Ci |
Ci ⊆ C} is the set of subsets of C, i.e., the various combinations of rankings provided by basic
desires. S: N → Pow(C) is a function that specifies the set of preference relations activated in
situation N. Where multiple rankings are activated, the final evaluation is a weighted sum of the
rankings provided by particular desires. (This is a controversial claim, but it makes sense under
certain conditions.)95 In situation N a person will have the set of activated rankings S(N) = CN.
Her ranking of states will be given by uCN(·) = Σi∈CNwiui(·) where wi is the weight of the ith
desire. She will choose an aj ∈ A such that uCN(aj) > uCN(ak) for all ak ∈ A. Expected utilities
depend on probability functions in the standard way. Let B: N
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function that specifies a set of salient propositions for each situation. The probabilities that a
person assigns given that she takes action ai, P(· | ai), in situation N are P(· | ai & B(N)).
Appeal to understandings can account for the cases that create trouble for orthodox
economics. It handles the description-dependent preference cases in exactly the way Prospect
Theory does—framing in terms of gains or losses from reference points is a kind of
understanding. 96 It matters that the price I can sell my stock for is not merely $X, but $10 less
than I was expecting, because this expectation brings certain values to mind.

Likewise,

reflecting on people who are recently dead brings to mind a different set of beliefs and interests
than thinking about people who are about to die. This sort of appeal to different sets of mental
states provides a potential explanation for the risk attitudes that are just built into Prospect
Theory: losses make powerful fears salient; gains make fantasies salient but they are less
powerful. We know how to live with our status quo situation, at least in most cases. It is easy,
however, to imagine, and so fear, losses—we can think about what might happen when we lose
the familiar. It is less easy to imagine gains—the new is unfamiliar and we might not know how
it would affect our lives. Likewise, it isn’t difficult to see how focusing on some considerations
and not others would lead someone to divide up the space of outcomes being considered in a
particular way. Schick’s understandings are similar to Kahneman-Tversky-Thaler-style framing
in that both posit a pre-processing step where the inputs that influence behavior are specified.
Traditional framing, however, misses a lot of what is useful in understandings because it still
assumes that people consult all of their wants, interests, values, etc. when calculating gains or
losses. The understandings account goes beyond what either standard or behavioral economics is
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even willing to look at by allowing that people can act on a proper subset of their desires and
beliefs.
This approach also promises to help solve a number of philosophical problems regarding
human action, including puzzles about inner conflict and weakness of will.97 It provides, in
particular, an attractive alternative to building “bounded willpower” directly into behavioral
models.

After all, seeing willpower as a strictly limited commodity makes its opposite,

stubbornness, something of a mystery. And stubbornness in certain areas of life but not others
would be particularly perplexing. If willpower is a general-purpose capacity that is limited or a
feature of hyperbolic discounting of overall utility (or value), how can Steve be so resolute about
avoiding Wal-Mart and so irresolute about his food intake?

A model that invokes

understandings can account for both stubbornness and weak will. Someone who sees a decision
as a matter of principle will have access to all of the motivational reinforcement that principle
has to offer. Someone who is trying to lay off the doughnuts, on the other hand, would like to
focus on the health risks of junk food. He is used to focusing on the pleasure it brings, however,
so he often sees them as pleasurable and proceeds to eat.
There is no problem in seeing which desires motivate weak-willed actions—we can
determine the desires that people actually act on. Appeal to understandings explains why people
tried to advance those goals and not others—they work toward the ends that are before their
minds. This account handles even the most difficult cases, ones where a person performs an
action that she acknowledges, even at the time she acts, is not the best overall. The key to
thinking through such cases is realizing that there is a distinction between access to a desire and
activation of that desire. Clearly, a person can have beliefs about her own desires. Such beliefs
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can be activated even when the desires they concern are not. Admittedly, such cases are likely to
be rare because having a belief about a desire would normally activate that desire. Still, they
seem to happen. Simply having access to a desire will not influence a person’s behavior in the
way that activation of that desire would—an agent can conclude that a proposed action is suboptimal considering a certain desire, but not care because that desire is not activated, and so not
part of her reason. This seems to be precisely what happens. When a person acts against what
she acknowledges is a more important consideration than the one she is acting on, she will often
report that she doesn’t care about it now or that she can’t think about it now. This indicates that
she isn’t feeling the pull of that consideration. People are able to make intellectual judgments
about optimal actions, all things considered, using a process that models desires but doesn’t
employ them. This seems to be how much of our deliberation about the future actually works.
Paradoxically, the understandings approach also has the potential to salvage more of
orthodox economic theory than most behavioral approaches. Consider, for example, the “tunnel
vision” on “bottom line” considerations induced by market contexts. Within those contexts,
standard economic theory fares pretty well. It is only when further considerations (e.g., fairness,
security) get involved that things begin to fall apart. The approach of behavioral economics—
which involves building various behavioral effects straight into the standard models—sacrifices,
to some extent, the intuitive connections between preferences and beliefs and the parts of models
that represent them. The intuitive plausibility of standard models is better preserved by looking
at which beliefs and interests are operating in a particular case. And this is exactly what an
understandings approach does, for an appeal to understandings provides a mechanism by which
context can influence behavior. Where a circumstance makes the sorts of things that economists
look at salient, people act in the way economists predict. Where a situation brings a threat
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(opportunity, etc.) to the foreground, agents act in light of that threat (opportunity, etc.). An
account that includes this sort of framing is able to account for both the cases that confound
orthodox economics and the cases that confound behavioral economics.
Behavioral and understanding approaches can provide competitive explanations for
particular phenomena.98 In order to decide between approaches in such cases, research will need
to be done. That being said, it is important to see that adding understandings is not incompatible
with the various behavioral moves. We have good reason to expect that some combination of
approaches will be required to account for the full range of behavioral complexity. It is unlikely,
for example, that beliefs are always adequately modeled by subjective probabilities, even when
appropriately conditionalized.
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In order to handle the empirical evidence, economics will

probably need to take a two-track approach: look for more common-sense resources (“top
down”) and fit the descriptive models to the data (“bottom up”).100
The concept of understandings helps in this regard by providing a top-down approach. It
can be formalized in a way consistent with standard economic theory, and can therefore capture
the successes of standard accounts. At the same time, an understandings approach can also
explain many of the empirical findings that drive the development of behavioral models
including (but perhaps not limited to) Prospect Theory, Mental Accounting, and claims of
bounded willpower. Because it does so by providing an account of the underlying mechanism
that motivates seemingly anomalous behavior, the approach may allow us to mediate among the
various behavioral accounts, as well as help integrate them into standard models. And, finally,
an understandings approach may also explain the cases that escape both standard and behavioral
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accounts (think of Orwell’s sniping or our tunnel vision in market contexts). The result of all
this—a more unified theory of behavior—would allow us to better predict and regulate human
behavior.
Social scientists tend to be suspicious about views that claim too many advantages,
especially when those advantages include the unification of contending accounts. The worry
here is that if people can understand situations in any which way, then there is no behavior,
however off the wall, that is inconsistent with the account. An unfalsifiable theory, however, has
no place in social science. Some views really are too good to be true (or at least too good to be
scientific truths).
All accounts of human behavior (or at least all of the remotely plausible ones) face
criticism along these lines because they appeal to mental states that aren’t directly observable.101
A theory would be unfalsifiable if it always avoided empirical evidence by changing its
interpretation of unobservable conditions.

Common sense appeal to desires and beliefs is

sometimes derided because we could always come up with mental states that would rationalize
any bit of behavior.102 Obviously, standard economic accounts are subject to exactly the same
criticism. 103 Behavioral accounts come in for similar criticism, often from economists and their
allies.104
What should we think about this type of criticism? For one thing, it seems to rule out
most of modern social science on the grounds that it appeals to unobservables. Perhaps the
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criticism itself is too good (or powerful) to be true.105 Still, there are some legitimate issues
raised by this line of thought. It is a mistake, for example, to inter-define behavioral inputs and
outputs (e.g., to hold that when an agent does y, it follows that she wanted to do y). To do so
would automatically fit the unobservable inputs to the observable outputs.106 Further, adding
extra inputs to behavioral models does make it harder to test those models. As we make more
distinctions among circumstances, there are fewer relevantly similar situations to serve as test
cases.107 Finally, there is a problem for theorists rather than theories. Even a testable account
can have adherents who are willing to make ad hoc assumptions about input conditions just to
fend off difficult data.108 This sort of “faith-based” adherence to an account speaks less to the
legitimacy of a theory than to the character of certain theorists, but there is certainly a pitfall here
to avoid.
The foregoing problems are not insurmountable. No social scientist worth her salt fixes
the identity conditions of mental states in purely behavioral terms. A person’s behavior, of
course, provides crucial evidence for the attribution of mental states to her, but it is overall
patterns of behavior that serve this role. No action is the sole evidence for its own (purported)
causal antecedents. Each theory of action identifies certain behavioral inputs, outputs, and
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processes. The unobservability of particular mental states or processes ensures that no single bit
of evidence will serve as a critical test for an account. Still, it is possible for a pattern of
evidence to be incompatible with the pattern predicted by a behavioral theory.109
With regard to the account we are urging, understandings are like desires and beliefs (and
preferences, value functions, subjective probabilities, decision weights, etc.) in that they are
implicitly characterized by the role they play in their home theory.110 This theory provides what
is basically an associationist account of limited attention. Understandings certainly aren’t free
variables on this account—they are constrained by the character of the motivating cases. One
couldn’t, for example, understand a problem in a way she had never entertained before. An agent
is likely to understand a circumstance in terms of concepts and attitudes that she has strongly
internalized or those to which she has recently been exposed.
Adding understandings does increase the difficulty in testing behavioral theory because it
increases the number of inputs to keep track of. Still, it is possible to present agents with similar
circumstances framed in similar ways, so it doesn’t make testing impossible. 111 Druckerman’s
work on how “framing effects depend in critical ways on context” provides a good starting point
for testing an understandings-based account.112 His emphasis on persuasion, counter framing,
and heterogeneous discussion suggests that environmental factors can broaden an agent’s
understanding even to such an extent that she will approximate orthodox economic outcomes.113
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A more unified approach would go a long way toward convincing legal policymakers to
act upon the recommendations of economists, standard and behavioral. The approach described
here—which adds understandings to the basic desire-belief elements of standard economics—
captures the successes of standard law and economics and addresses many of the concerns of the
behavioral law and economists. That alone seems worth the price of admission. But in addition,
an understandings approach may also provide some insight into legal issues that current
economic approaches, both standard and behavioral, leave us unsatisfied.
Take, for example, voting, which has been long been seen as a puzzle for standard
economics.114 The puzzle isn’t the more familiar one of trying to explain low voter turnout, but
its opposite—trying to explain why people bother to vote at all. The problem is that the decision
to cast a ballot appears irrational: the costs of voting (in time and effort) almost always exceed
the benefits likely to flow from casting a single ballot (in large part because the chance of casting
the tie-breaking vote—even in relatively small, closely-contested municipal elections—is
mathematically miniscule). Nevertheless, millions of people routinely make the economically
pointless decision to vote.
Voting is thus seized upon as an example of the failure of standard economic theory. 115 It
must be that people are not just narrowly self-interested maximizers of their own utility; instead,
their self-interest is “bounded.”116

Voting, like charitable giving and other selfless acts,
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demonstrate one of the flaws of the rational-actor basis of standard economics. Beyond this
insight, however, behavioral economics offers little guidance on resultant questions, such as why
people choose to vote rather than engage in other types of selfless (or selfish) behavior.
Standard economics, though, has a perfectly plausible comeback on this question: people
vote because they like to vote.117

As discussed above, standard economic theory can

accommodate other-regarding values and behavior; the “bounded self-interest” claim is no more
convincing here than it is elsewhere.

Practitioners of law and economics then move onto

subsidiary (although perhaps more useful) questions about changes in voting behavior, such as
why voter turnout increases in closely-contested elections or why voting increases with the
wealth and education of the voter.118 Here, too, they have answers—people, for example, are
more likely to vote in closely contested elections because information costs are lower.119 It is
much easier to come by information about candidates and issues in highly competitive elections,
because there’s much more extensive campaigning and media coverage.

And perhaps the

wealthy and well-educated vote in order to signal that they are cooperators in order to obtain
cooperative returns from others in society: the signal only works if it is costly to vote, and the
opportunity costs of voting rise with wealth and education. 120
An understandings approach should help us out a bit when trying to develop a framework
that explains voting behavior. On the issue of why people vote, it may be, as standard economics
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holds, that voting is a rational thing to do: all things considered, some people value voting more
than its demands on their time. But it may also be that when people decide to vote, they aren’t
considering all things; instead, they’re merely consulting a particular subset of their desires and
beliefs, given their understanding of the current situation. Election day may bring all sorts of
beliefs and desires relating to civic virtue online, focusing people’s attention on voting. An
understandings approach is consistent with the standard answer. At the same time, it is more
plausible than the standard approach here because it isn’t necessary to assume that people decide
to vote after considering all of their beliefs and desires (and all possible courses of action
associated with them).
An understandings approach also helps us on the subsidiary issues as well. For example,
on the question of why turnout increases in closely-contested elections, it may be, as standard
theory has it, that people are more likely to vote because information is cheap. But it seems just
as plausible that the extra campaigning and media coverage serve more as an attention-getting
device than as a means to lower information costs. People vote because they’ve been reading,
listening, watching, and talking about the election—they are focused on the election. To be sure,
they also come to the polls armed with some extra, relatively low-cost information about the
candidates and the issues. But there’s nothing inconsistent about adopting both a standard
account and an understandings approach when trying to fully understand behavior. Indeed,
under our approach, one would expect that the fundamental question to be answered when
analyzing any kind of unexpected behavior is whether it was motivated by a new belief, a new
desire, or a new understanding of the situation.
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CONCLUSION
Standard economic theory has provided a great deal of insight into existing law and
guidance for legal policymaking. And the law and economics movement had a number of
successes, especially in areas involving the regulation of market behavior like antitrust and
environmental law.

But most of its significant work, involving relatively straightforward

applications of economic theory, has now been completed. At this point, law and economics
scholars are left to filling in doctrinal interstices and, significantly, attempting to explain
empirical results that appear to contradict some of its most fundamental precepts. As Russell
Korobkin and Thomas Ulen aptly put it, it is as though “[t]he law-and-economics movement has
suffered from the truthfulness of one of its most important postulates: the law of diminishing
marginal returns.”121
At this stage of its development, the value of behavioral law and economics lies in its
potential. The empirical findings of behavioral economics are sufficiently robust for us to
conclude that some of the assumptions of standard economic theory are mistaken. Now the
problem is figuring out how the ever-expanding list of heuristics, biases, and norms interact with
each other (and with standard accounts). In other words, there is a distinct need to develop a
unitary theory of behavior in order to move forward.
We believe that adding the concept of understandings to the basic desire-belief machinery
of economics is the kind of top-down approach that could help lead to the development of a more
complete theory of human behavior. This is, in part, because it can be formalized in a way that is
consistent with standard economic theory. At the same time, it is capable of capturing some of
the empirical results that drive some of the more prominent behavioral models. In any case, it
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represents a step in the right direction, toward a more unified (and empirically sound) economic
theory. And, as part of such a theory, it also stands a better chance of being operationalized into
law.

57

